



Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice

FIFA World Cup 2010

Crowded Places Guidance



produced by

NaCTSO

National Counter Terrorism Security Office

What is NaCTSO?

The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) works on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers, Terrorism and Allied Matters (ACPO TAM) in partnership with the Security Service to reduce the impact of terrorism in the United Kingdom by:

- Protecting the UK's most vulnerable and valuable sites and assets.
- Enhancing the UK's resilience to terrorist attack.
- Delivering protective security advice across the crowded places sectors.

What this guide will do?

The threat from international terrorism favours the targeting of crowded places. Therefore, raising the awareness of partners about the threat and considering some simple measures to help reduce it will help contribute to a safe and successful event.

This guide will assist you in achieving these outcomes.

Planning for events

Planning allows you to think about ways in which you can foresee the risks associated with a terrorist attack on a crowded place. Effective planning and partnership working can help to prevent the risks and reduce their consequences. This approach will be familiar to you in terms of a pre-planned event.

However, another type of event can occur swiftly and with little warning. These spontaneous events have the potential to become troublesome from both a safety and security perspective.

Although spontaneous it is worth considering in advance potential operational counter measures, should such an event occur. It is useful to ask 'What if' questions around the spontaneous events that can often divert resources and require immediate management.

A central planning principle has to be that safety must take precedence over security matters where these are in conflict.

It is worth trying to establish some basic operational principles to help deal with spontaneous events. Everyone, not just the police, have a role to play in these situations.

More help

Your force Counter Terrorism Security Adviser (CTSA) can provide you with guidance and advice relating to any particular counter-terrorism concerns you may have about a location or event.

A series of protective security guides have been produced by NaCTSO and they will aid you in formulating measures to address the terrorism threat.

The guide '*Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Major Events*' is of particular relevance and sections from the document are referenced in this guide for your convenience.

The guide can be downloaded free of charge from the NaCTSO website: www.nactso.gov.uk

Working with others

It is vital that all those who can contribute to a safe and successful event are identified at an early stage.

It is helpful to adopt an approach that:

- Engages in pragmatic risk assessments;
- Develops an action-orientated plan; and
- Builds on existing strengths and capabilities of all the partners.

Event organisers can make a positive contribution to the safety and security of an event and some key areas are identified below.

Administration and marketing

The security benefits of administrative measures can sometimes be overlooked. The provision of passes, stewards' tabards and programme printing provide opportunities to communicate a security message at an event. The way an event is marketed can give an early indication of the likely composition of the expected crowd.

Staffing the event

Providing good quality stewards is vital to the success of any event and can greatly assist the police where a policing presence is required. Raising the awareness of stewards and other officials around hostile reconnaissance, dealing with a suspect device and actions to take in an emergency should be part of the pre-event planning and briefing. Your CTSA can provide you with information regarding Projects ARGUS and Griffin. Both projects can aid you to achieve counter terrorism awareness.

Event equipment

The effective use of seating, communications, signs, projection equipment, lighting, fencing and barriers, can all play a part in ensuring a safe and secure area. It is important to consider the effect that a failure of a large screen for instance, could have on the disposition of the crowd and the consequent potential for public disorder.

Event facilities

These include facilities such as, first aid provision, catering, bar areas, and car parking, All of these can have an effect on crowd dynamics.

Thinking about your event

Safety and security around these events is paramount and is best addressed through effective partnerships and robust co-ordination.

Generally, the coverage of significant sporting events now extends beyond the stadium or sports arena. Large screens transmit coverage of events 'live' to public places, which attract large crowds, often gathering at a predetermined time. From a counter terrorism viewpoint this can make such public places potentially vulnerable.

The Risks

Large scale events in public places inevitably carry with them risks associated with public safety, disorder and sadly the potential for a terrorist attack. You will probably be familiar with the first two, but it is the last risk that we will concentrate on here.

An attack is likely to involve no warning, be multiple and co-ordinated in nature and undertaken to create mass casualties. The favoured locations for such attacks are often busy crowded places.

An attack could involve:

- **Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED):** *Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Major Events: vehicle borne improvised explosive devices p49.*
- **Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED):** *Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Major Events: suicide attacks p53.*
- **Placed Improvised Explosive Device (PIED):** *Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Major Events: Search planning p29 and Evacuation planning p33.*
- **Firearm and Weapon attacks:** *Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Major Events: firearm and weapon attacks p54.*

A blend of different attack types is possible and a person or vehicle-borne attack could involve the suicide of the terrorist. *Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Major Events: Evacuation planning p33.*

The Principles.

There are a series of basic principles you should take cognisance of when working with others on the planning of such events.

- No vehicle should be allowed to penetrate your event perimeter or building.
- Keep vehicles as far away from buildings and concentrations of people as is reasonably practicable.

Understanding Crowded Places

Identifying the features that might impact on safety and security provides a good starting point. It is helpful to consider a crowded place as a dynamic process involving factors acting together dynamically to make and keep it 'crowded'. Recognising these factors provides a useful way to identify simple measures that can be employed to reduce the risk.

The four key factors that make a place crowded are shown in the table below.

Crowd Concentration and Composition

Is the number of people present at any one time in the space commensurate with public safety?

Crowd Flow Rate

Can people move freely through the space reasonably unhindered?

Physical Dimensions of the Space

Do the physical dimensions of the space allow for adequate individual space commensurate with safety?

Increasing Dwell-time

Are there factors beyond those necessary for the event that may increase the probability of people dwelling for long periods at one location?

It is helpful to consider each of these factors from a safety and security perspective and recognising the practical measures that can be taken to reduce the risk.

Going through this process will help you:

- Identify what security improvements you need to make;
- Identify what type of security and contingency plans you need to develop; and
- Provide reassurance that you have the plans in place to deal with the expected risks.

Crowd Concentration and Composition

This is a judgement that can be best made at the time of the event, although the previous history of the event, its importance to the crowd and knowledge of the crowd's likely composition can all give an indication of its potential popularity.

Do you have a clear understanding of the composition of the crowd?

The timing of the event, the nature of its marketing and location can all give an indication of the likely dynamic of a crowd. This is important since managing a crowd may demand different approaches depending on whether it is predominately family orientated or predominately young males.

Is there access to alcohol?

Excessive alcohol consumption can contribute to public disorder and make compliance with instructions given in an emergency situation more difficult, thereby putting the safety of all concerned at risk.

Close liaison with local licensed premises is essential in order to monitor potential flashpoints and ensure that intoxicated individuals are identified and if possible prevented from entering the event.

Crowd Flow Rate

Can people move freely through the space reasonably unhindered?

This is important especially when looking at entering or leaving the area of the event. In an emergency the ability of people to leave the scene quickly is vital.

Has consideration been given to removing street clutter?

The removal of litter bins, skips and other impedimenta can ensure better crowd flow, and help remove opportunities for placed improvised explosive devices to be secreted.

Enforcement activity against unlicensed street vendors can also help to reduce risks associated with crime and again improve crowd flow.

Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Major Events: Good housekeeping p19.

Has an evacuation area been identified for the event?

The ability to move people to a place of safety following an emergency need to be carefully managed in all circumstances, but especially from a counter-terrorism viewpoint.

Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Major Events: Evacuation planning p33.

Has consideration been given to 'no parking zones' at the venue and along roads leading immediately to and from the venue?

The greatest risk lies with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against a crowd. The simple protection principles are:

- Keep vehicles away from concentrations of people wherever possible.
- Achieve the maximum distance you can between vehicles and concentrations of people.
- If it is not possible to keep vehicles away then consideration should be given to screening and checking all vehicles that are in situ are legitimate.
- The deployment of physical barriers needs to be carefully considered taking account of planning regulations and fire safety risk assessments.

Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Major Events: : vehicle borne improvised explosive devices p49.

Physical Dimensions of the Space.

These will be relatively fixed for venues, especially within urban settings, and there may be little opportunity to 'extend space'. Consequently, the ability to move people quickly from the venue to a place of relative safety is vital.

Consideration should be given, especially in city-centre environments, to the risk posed by the effect of blast on glazing. Keeping people as far away as possible from areas with extensive glazing will help to reduce the risk of death and injury.

The use of large screens to show live events will catch the eye and sound will travel for some distance. This will inevitably attract people to spontaneously enter the area and spaces within the immediate environs may become crowded.

Thought should be given to the location and siting of public amenities e.g. toilets since they often have effects on crowd flow and increase dwell-times.

Every effort should be made to ensure that these secondary concentrations of people do not obstruct or reduce the crowd flow to and from the designated space, or block evacuation routes and assembly areas of other crowded places operating nearby.

Increasing Dwell-Time

Any event that attracts large numbers of people will have attractions that encourage people to dwell in particular areas and can cause concentrations of people to develop within a venue.

Refreshment areas, entry and exits points and secondary entertainments can all produce increases in dwell-times. This can have effects on the flow rates within a crowd and crowd concentrations can increase dramatically in these particular areas. Consideration should also be given to these areas not only from a terrorist targeting viewpoint, but also that of public safety.

It is good practice to ensure that activities at the venue that may increase dwell-times within a crowd should not be sited near features that may present a vulnerability i.e. an area with extensive glazing.

Useful checklists

Dealing with a suspicious item using 8 - key actions

1. Do not touch suspicious items.
2. Move everyone away to a safe distance.
3. Prevent others from approaching.
4. Communicate safely to staff, business visitors and the public.
5. Use hand-held radios or mobile phones away from the immediate vicinity of a suspect item.
6. Remain out of line of sight of the suspicious item and behind ballistic cover.
7. Notify the police.
8. Ensure that whoever found the item or witnessed the incident remains on hand to brief the police.

Dealing with a firearms incident using 4 Cs

If you are pre-planning for these events in partnership with non police organisations, consider offering the following advice to your partners when dealing with a firearm or weapon attack.

REMEMBER, ALL OF YOUR ACTIONS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT EXPOSING YOURSELF TO UNNECESSARY DANGER.

Cover

The first action you are likely to take is to find some cover. There is an important distinction that you need to understand in relation to cover.

There are two types of cover:

- Cover from view.
- Cover from fire (ballistic cover).

Cover from view means that the gunman cannot see you, but you could still fall victim to a gunman because you may not have effective ballistic protection.

For example, hiding behind a wooden fence may keep you out of sight, but bullets can pass easily through a wooden fence because it provides no ballistic cover.

Ballistic cover can provide you with the protection you need from the lethal effects of firearms.

Examples of good ballistic cover could be:

- Behind substantial material: brickwork, reinforced concrete and steel.
- Behind the engine block of a motor vehicle.
- Behind a substantial living tree at its base.
- If in the open look for undulating ground and seek out hollows or mounds that provide substantial protection.

Confirm

- It is a firearm incident.
- The exact location of the firearm incident.
- The number of gunmen.
- The type of firearms. Are they handguns or long- barrelled?

This is important, as long-barrelled weapons are generally effective over a very long distance, unlike a handgun that is effective over a much shorter distance. The police and others will need to know the potential firearms capability of the terrorists and this information will assist them.

- The direction of travel of the gunmen.
- Be prepared to answer other questions the 999 operator may ask you.

Contact

- The police must be contacted immediately via 999 with the information set out under 'Confirm'.
- Use all the communication channels available to you to inform staff, customers and others of the danger.
- Plan for a firearms incident:
 - How would you communicate with staff and customers?
 - What key messages would you give them to help keep them safe?
 - Think about incorporating this type of incident into your Incident Management Plan (IMP) BS25999.

Control

- As far as you can limit access to your immediate environment.
- Encourage people to avoid public areas such as corridors and foyers.
- If you are in a room stay there and lock the door.
- Move away from the door and remain quiet.


Useful Publications:



NaCTSO Major Events
– Counter Terrorism
Protective Security Advice



The 'Green' Guide
– Guide to safety at Sports
Grounds



The 'Purple' Guide
– The Event Safety Guide

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